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Abstract 
This paper develops a general framework under 
Dempster-Shafer theory for assessing fraud risk in a 
financial statement audit by integrating the evidence 
pertaining to the presence of fraud triangle factors 
(incentives, attitude and opportunities), and evidence 
concerning both account-based and evidence-based 
fraud schemes. This framework extends fraud risk 
assessment models in prior research in three respects. 
1) It integrates fraud schemes, both account schemes 
through which accounts are manipulated, and evidence 
schemes through which frauds are concealed, into a 
single framework. 2) It incorporates prior fraud 
frequency information obtained from the Accounting 
and Auditing Enforcement Releases issued by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission into an evidential 
network which uses Conditional OR relationships 
among assertions. 3) The framework provides a 
structured approach for connecting risk assessment, 
audit planning, and evaluation of audit results. The 
paper uses a real fraud case to illustrate the 
application of the framework. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The main objective of this paper is to develop a 
general framework for assessing the risk of fraud 
committed by management in reporting the financial 
performance of a company using the evidential 
reasoning approach under Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory 
of belief functions. In more specific terms, the objective 
of the paper is to develop a general framework for 
assessing fraud risk using an evidential reasoning 
approach by integrating fraud triangle factors 
(Incentives, Attitude, and Opportunities which must be 
present for management to commit fraud) with fraud 
schemes (schemes through which management 
perpetrates fraud). In addition, this study incorporates 
both the account-based fraud schemes and evidence-
based fraud schemes into the fraud risk assessment 
framework. Account-based fraud schemes are used by 
management to manipulate account balances, while 
evidence-based fraud schemes are used to deceive 
auditors and conceal fraud [11] by creating bogus 
evidence or manipulating evidence by colluding with 
customers. In addition, the framework integrates 
frequency information of fraud schemes obtained from 
previous fraud cases disclosed by the SEC to help 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of fraud 
detection.  
In recent years, management fraud has drawn 
heightened attention from all sectors of the economy 
due to the occurrence of fraud in several major public 
companies [20, 43].. Simultaneously, the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants released SAS 
99 [2] to replace SAS 82 [1] on consideration of fraud 
in financial statement audits. The new standard 
emphasizes the importance of evaluating fraud risk 
from the view of the three fraud triangle factors and 
the use of brainstorming sessions to assess fraud risk 
and evaluate how fraud could be perpetrated. 
However, SAS 99 does not provide detailed guidance 
on how auditors should consider fraud schemes in risk 
assessment or how auditors should adjust audit 
programs to respond to the assessed fraud risk. 
The present study uses a real fraud case to 
illustrate the application of the framework and 
demonstrates how to make preliminary fraud risk 
assessments, how to plan audit programs, how to 
aggregate and evaluate audit evidence, and how to 
make a final assessment of fraud risk. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 reviews prior literature. Section 3 presents a 
general evidential reasoning framework for fraud risk 
assessment. Section 4 uses a real fraud case to 
illustrate how auditors may use evidential diagrams to 
perform fraud risk assessment, to plan audit programs, 
and to evaluate audit results. Section 5 concludes with 
a discussion of contributions and future research. 
 
2. Prior research  
 
Since this paper deals with both the application of 
an evidential reasoning approach under DS theory and 
the fraud risk assessment process, we provide a brief 
literature review in both areas. The evidential 
reasoning approach presented is a structured approach 
where decisions are made based on the evidence 
available and uncertainties in the evidence are 
modeled using DS theory [16]. This approach has 
been used in many disciplines from multiple-attribute 
decision making with uncertainty [43, 44] to 
information security [38] and WebTrust services [34]. 
Srivastava and his co-authors have applied this 
approach to auditing and assurance services [18, 31, 
37]. We apply this approach to assess the risk of fraud 
committed by management.  
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 Prior studies on fraud risk assessment focus largely 
on using fraud risk factors and “red flags” to assess the 
overall risk of fraudulent financial reporting. In this 
approach, which has been adopted in SAS 99 [2], the 
auditor identifies the presence of red flags and then 
assesses the risk of fraud [5; 8, 9, 23].  
To facilitate the use of red flags, various decision 
aids have been developed including checklists, 
regression models and expert systems. Although the 
checklist is the most common decision aid, it may be 
ineffective [23].  Prior research finds that regression 
models perform better than a simple checklist and that 
expert systems perform better than either checklists or 
regression models [5; 8]. One potential limitation of 
such approaches is that they assess fraud risk without 
considering the impact of evidence concerning fraud 
schemes which are used by management to perpetrate 
and conceal fraud.  
Prior fraud research using other approaches such as 
neural network [13] and strategic auditing where the 
audit process is treated as if it were a game, with auditors and 
management functioning as the players [6, 21] are also 
restricted to the assessment of fraud risk without 
considering the impact of fraud schemes. Thus, even if 
the auditor correctly identifies a high-fraud-risk 
situation, the auditor may not design effective fraud 
detection procedures because he or she is misled by 
manipulated evidence provided by management. It may 
be helpful for auditors to consider how fraud can be 
perpetrated and concealed. To consider this possibility, 
this study integrates the assessment and tests of fraud 
schemes into the process of fraud risk assessment with 
the objective of improving effectiveness of fraud 
detection. 
As mentioned earlier, the proposed framework uses 
the DS Theory of Belief Functions as the formalism for 
defining and managing uncertainties involved in the 
audit evidence. Several studies suggest that Belief 
Functions provide a useful framework for mapping 
uncertainties and ambiguity in the audit judgment 
process [7, 14, 26]. We assume that readers have a 
basic understanding of DS theory and thus do not 
provide an introduction to the theory. However, for a 
detailed introduction, we encourage readers to see [29, 
33, 37]. 
3. A general evidential diagram for fraud 
risk assessment  
 
This paper uses an evidential reasoning approach to 
develop a framework for assessing fraud risk and to 
facilitate audit planning. Under this approach, an 
auditor assesses the status of assertions based on partial 
knowledge about a variable of interest such as a 
material account balance in the financial statement and 
knowledge about other variables or assertions that are 
related to the particular account balance variable [22. 
39].  
Figure 1 presents a general evidential diagram for 
assessing fraud risk. The oval-shaped boxes represent 
assertions and sub-assertions, the rectangular boxes 
represent items of audit evidence, and circles represent 
relational nodes connected to assertions and sub-
assertions. Dotted lines are used to represent those 
assertions or items of evidence that could have been 
connected to related assertions but were omitted in the 
diagram for simplification. As constructed, Figure 1 
indicates that the assessment as to whether fraud is 
present in Account A depends on five general types of 
evidence: results of analytical procedures, the 
evaluation of the fraud triangle factors, evidence about 
general account schemes and specific account 
schemes, and evidence about specific evidence 
schemes. 
At the left is the main variable being investigated, 
specifically whether material fraud is or is not present 
in a particular financial account. This variable is 
evaluated in the form of an assertion – fraud is present 
in Account A. The expectation in most audits is that 
collected audit evidence will disconfirm this assertion. 
The assertion nodes include different levels of 
assertions where sub-assertions are connected to the 
main assertion through relational nodes. In Figure 1, 
all relationships are assumed to be ‘Conditional OR’ 
or ‘CR’. Srivastava, Gao, and Gillett [32] have 
modeled “Conditional OR (CR)” under DS theory for 
propagating beliefs in a network of variables. Under 
this relationship, the sub-assertions in a network of 
variables are related to the main assertion through  
“OR” logic, i.e., if any of the sub-assertions is true 
then the main assertion is true. In the case of fraud, 
this is the logical relationship between the various 
fraud schemes and the main fraud objective. That is, 
fraud will occur if any of the fraud schemes such as 
the recording of fictitious revenues are evident. 
However, the reverse relationship is conditioned 
upon historical frequency evidence. For example, if 
fraud is suspected, i.e., there is evidence that fraud has 
occurred but where it has occurred may not be known; 
it may depend upon the most likely fraud schemes that 
management in the past has found easy to perpetrate 
and conceal it from the auditor. Evidence nodes (the 
rectangular nodes) provide the evidence that the 
auditor collects to assess the level of support in favor 
of or against the corresponding assertions or sub-
assertions.   
Under the belief-function framework, items of 
audit evidence are combined using Dempster’s rule 
[25]. We use the Shenoy and Shafer [27] “local 
computation” technique for propagating beliefs at each 
assertion and sub-assertion in the evidential diagram 
to determine the overall belief at each node in the 
network.  
In Figure 1 there are three levels of sub-assertions 
beyond the main assertion. The first level indicates the 
general account schemes that have been used to 
commit fraud. The second assertion level indicates the 
specific account schemes that have been used and the 
third assertion level identifies specific evidence 
schemes used to conceal fraud.  
 
4. Use of evidential reasoning approach 
in fraud risk assessment 
 Having completed the evidential diagram, the next 
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 step is to gather relevant evidence pertaining to various 
assertions and sub-assertions to determine the overall 
belief and plausibility whether the main assertion is 
true, i.e., fraud is present in account A.   
Under DS theory, the belief in fraud, Bel(fraud), 
represents the total belief that fraud is present based on 
the evidence. Bel(fraud) = 0 implies that we have no 
evidence indicating that there is fraud. Also, Bel(no 
fraud) = 0 implies that we have no evidence that there is 
‘no fraud’; a situation of complete ignorance with 
respect to the assertions being investigated. This may 
be the situation when the auditor starts an audit 
engagement for a new client; the auditor lacks evidence 
in favor or in negation of assertions being true. 
However, under the complete ignorance situation the 
plausibility of fraud being present and not being present 
is 1, that is Pl(fraud) = 1 and Pl(no fraud) = 1. 
Consider another situation where the auditor has 
very weak evidence that fraud is present, say at a belief 
of 0.01 on a scale of 0-1, that is Bel(fraud) = 0.01, and 
moderately strong evidence that fraud is not present say 
at a belief of 0.6, that is Bel(no fraud) = 0.6. We 
assume these belief values are based on the available 
audit evidence. We provide several examples of such 
items of evidence in Section 5.  
Since Pl(A) = 1 – Bel(not A), given the above 
values, Pl(fraud) = 0.4 and Pl(no fraud) = 0.99. Note 
that while the evidence suggests that fraud is not 
present with a belief of 0.6, it is plausible with degree 
0.99 that there is no fraud. Similarly, the evidence 
suggests that fraud is present with 0.01 belief, that is, 
the auditor has direct evidence that fraud is present with 
a low level of belief 0.01, while it is plausible that fraud 
could be present with 0.4 degree on a scale of 0-1. 
The above situation might arise when the auditor 
identifies discrepancies in accounting records or 
conflicting or missing evidential matter [2]. Based on 
just this evidence, fraud is possible, although with only 
a belief of 0.01, but with a plausibility of 0.4. 
 Next, we discuss how the assessed belief in fraud 
and fraud risk should impact the audit process in terms 
of further evidence collection. As the audit team is 
investigating fraud risk, a strategy needs to be selected 
concerning whether additional evidence needs to be 
collected or whether this particular phase of the audit is 
complete (that is, whether sufficient, competent 
evidence has been obtained in order to reach a 
conclusion). For the above situation where the 
plausibility of fraud is 0.4, an appropriate strategy for a 
skeptical auditor would be to investigate further until 
either the additional evidence reduces the plausibility of 
fraud, i.e., the fraud risk, to a much lower level or 
indicates that belief in fraud surpasses a threshold, say 
0.10. The plausibility of fraud, Pl(fraud), can be 
interpreted as fraud risk under DS theory. This 
interpretation is similar to the definition of audit risk as 
suggested by Srivastava and Shafer [38]. 
In general, the objective of an audit of financial 
statements is to determine, with reasonable assurance, 
whether the financial statements are free from material 
misstatements due to error or fraud. The auditor issues 
an unqualified opinion if there is sufficient and 
competent evidence that provide  reasonable  assurance 
that the financial statements are free from material 
misstatements due to error or fraud.  
If plausibility is used as the benchmark for fraud 
risk, this means that the auditor must have a 
reasonably high level of belief, say 0.95, that there is 
‘no fraud’ in the financial statements in order to give 
an unqualified opinion. This implies that, for an 
unqualified opinion, the plausibility that there is 
‘fraud’ in the financial statements has to be reasonably 
low, say 0.05. Plausibility will be equal to 0.05  if the 
belief in ‘no fraud’ is 0.95, even though there may be 
no or little evidence that fraud is present. 
In Section 5, we demonstrate how items of 
evidence can be combined with frequency information 
of fraud schemes to determine the overall belief in 
fraud, the overall belief in no fraud and the plausibility 
of fraud. 
 
5. An illustration of assessing belief in 
fraud and fraud risk 
 
To illustrate how auditors may use the evidential 
diagram to assess fraud risk and plan audit programs, a 
fraud case disclosed in AAERs by the SEC [40-43] is 
used. The fraud was committed by the management of 
FLIR Systems, Inc. (FLIR), a listed company 
designing and manufacturing thermal imaging and 
broadcast camera systems that detect infrared 
radiation. According to the SEC’s releases, FLIR 
engaged in a wide range of schemes to inflate revenue 
and earnings in 1998 and 1999.  
FLIR began its improper revenue recognition in 
the first quarter of 1998 and continued each quarter to 
overstate revenue by recognizing sham sales, improper 
bill-and-hold sales, sales with contingent terms, and 
sales without fixed commitment or price. Most of 
these improper practices were carried out at the end of 
each quarter.  
Next, we illustrate how auditors may use the 
evidential network to assess fraud risk through 
assessing the presence of fraud triangle factors. We 
then discuss how this assessment could be used to 
further plan the audit, to collect and aggregate audit 
evidence, and to assess the risk that material fraud has 
been committed. Figure 2 (Step 1) presents the 
evidential diagram for the fraud risk assessment based 
on the assessment of the presence of incentives, 
attitude, and opportunities to commit fraud in the 
revenue account of FLIR based on the model 
developed by [36]. The main assertion "Fraudulent 
Revenue" in Figure 2 is logically connected with the 
sub-assertions through an AND relationship because 
for fraud to occur, there must be Incentive, Attitude 
and Opportunity. 
In the analysis we assume that evidence designated 
‘E.Prior’ in Figure 2 (Step 1) is available from client 
acceptance analysis and results in an assessment of the 
belief that fraud is not present as 0.95 and the 
plausibility of fraud to be less than or equal to 0.05. 
We further assume that the prior belief in fraud equals 
0.00. These assumptions are indicated in Figure 2 
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 (Step 1) as a prior of (0.0, 0.95). The belief masses 
from the other nine items of evidence pertaining to the 
corresponding variables are given in the respective 
items of evidence. The first number represents the 
belief that the variable is true and the second number  
the belief that it is not true. These belief masses are 
assumed judgment based on the details available from 
the SEC description of the FLIR [39-41].  
For example, we use the following information to 
assess the presence of incentives to commit fraud. 
Throughout 1998 and 1999, FLIR’s senior management 
had established budgets that projected growth in FLIR's 
results. The company’s actual earnings per share in 
1998 generally met or exceeded analysts’ estimates, but 
revenues did not [40]. Also, FLIR acquired AGEMA 
Infrared Systems in December 1997 and merged with 
Inframetrics, Inc. in March 1999. Both mergers 
exacerbated the pressure on management to achieve 
financial goals. Although these factors are certainly not 
evidence of fraud, they are risk factors that indicate 
incentives for management to commit fraud. We use the 
above evidence pertaining to the fraud triangle factor 
"incentive" and assess the strength of the evidence to be 
0.05 for the evidence of pressures from mergers, 
represented by E.T.2 in Figure 2 (Step 1); and 0.1 for 
the evidence of earnings projection target and the 
evidence of annual bonus based on pre-tax profit, 
represented by E.T.1 and E.T.3 respectively in Figure 2 
(Step 1). Details on the remaining risk factors and the 
analysis of results from analytical procedures is 
available from the authors. 
All of the strength of evidence assessments (m-
values) including the prior belief of 0.95 that fraud was 
not present in the account are aggregated and 
propagated within the network. As Figure 2 (Step 1) 
shows, the updated assessment of belief that fraud is 
present in the revenue accounts is Bel(fraud) = 0.049 
and the belief that fraud is not present is 0.903. This 
implies that unassigned belief (the level of ambiguity) 
is 0.048. Thus the plausibility of fraud is assessed to be 
0.097. Thus the combination of some fraud triangle risk 
factors and some analytical procedures has resulted in a 
‘posterior’ fraud risk assessment that should be of 
concern to the audit team as it exceeds the 0.05 
threshold. Given this assessment, the audit team must 
then decide what to do next? The key decisions include 
deciding what additional audit procedures need to be 
conducted?  As will be seen, the framework sketched in 
Figure 1 facilitates this assessment greatly.  
Figure 2 (Step 2) represents the updated assessment 
of beliefs considering specific account schemes. If the 
preliminary assessment of fraud risk is at all significant, 
the auditor should then evaluate how management 
could have perpetrated fraud [2]. Figure 2 (Step 2) lists 
several examples of account schemes that have been 
used in previous fraud cases as disclosed in SEC 
releases [41-43]. The account schemes are classified 
into general schemes and specific schemes, and the sub-
assertions of specific schemes are connected through 
the “Conditional OR” (CR) relationship to the 
assertions of general schemes.  
The parameters of the CR relationships are based on 
the frequency of the revenue fraud cases as described in 
the SEC AAERs issued from 1997 to 2002. Because 
of  space limitations, details of these relationships are 
not provided. However, readers can obtain the details 
from the authors. In general, the audit team would 
have several other specific fraud schemes to consider, 
but to make the illustration simple, we have merged 
some of these specific schemes into broader schemes. 
During the process of understanding FLIR’s 
business and the preliminary assessment of fraud risk, 
the auditor may notice some characteristics of FLIR 
that could indicate the presence of certain types of 
fraud schemes. For example, as described in FLIR’s 
1998 annual report, 17.7 percent of FLIR’s revenue 
was derived from sales to agencies of the U.S. 
government. Some of these sales were contingent. 
This piece of evidence suggests a company that is able 
to prematurely recognize revenue. We assess the 
strength of this evidence, E.AS.1 in Figure 2 (Step 2) 
to be at a low level, say 0.1, to support the assertion of 
contingent sales.  
Throughout 1998, FLIR engaged in a significant 
number of bill-and-hold sales, which could indicate a 
risk of improperly recognized bill-and-hold sales. We 
assess the strength of this evidence (E.AS.2) to be 0.1.  
Lastly, compared to 1996 and 1997, FLIR had a 
continuous increase in its inventory turnover rate 
during 1998, particularly during the third and fourth 
quarters indicating that the inventory holding period 
was shortened in 1998. This indicates a risk of fraud 
scheme related to incomplete inventories. At the same 
time, FLIR had a relatively stable accounts receivable 
turnover rate. In other words, although inventory 
moved faster, the cash collection from sales was not 
improving. Both ratios then dropped dramatically in 
the first quarter of 1999. We assess the abnormal 
increase in the inventory turnover as a risk factor, 
represented by E.AP.4, providing support to the 
assertion of premature revenue recognition. The 
strength is assessed to be 0.05. 
After aggregating and propagating the beliefs from 
the main assertion to the sub-assertions of account 
schemes, we observe from Figure 2 (Step 2) that the 
updated plausibility of fraud is 0.124 with belief in 
fraud being 0.076. Further, the evidence suggests that 
the client is most likely to have committed fraud using 
“premature revenue recognition”, with belief of 0.054, 
and in particular using premature revenue recognition 
on contingent sales, with belief of 0.032. Our 
framework shows that the auditor should first perform 
audit procedures to evaluate whether premature 
revenue recognition has actually occurred 
Figure 3 (Step 3) represents the final step in 
assessing fraud risk where we consider the evidence 
specific to account schemes and evidence schemes. To 
improve audit effectiveness and efficiency when 
planning audit procedures and audit programs, it 
would seem prudent to focus on testing those 
assertions where there is the highest belief in fraud. 
Performing the kinds of assessments suggested using 
our framework has the advantage of providing 
rigorous, quantitative risk assessments. As for the 
audit of FLIR, the analysis implies that the auditor 
should have first assigned more effort to collect and 
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 evaluate evidence as to whether the company had 
recognized revenues prematurely, especially whether 
the company had recognized contingent sales 
improperly.  
When committing fraud, management often uses 
evidence schemes to deceive auditors and conceal 
fraud. Therefore, when belief in fraud is assessed to be 
high, the auditor should not only perform regular 
procedures but also procedures for the special purpose 
of detecting evidence-based fraud schemes. Figure 3 
integrates assertions of specific evidence schemes into 
the evidential diagram, and such assertions are 
connected to the assertion of revenue recognition on 
contingent sales through the CR relationship. 
When deciding on the nature of audit tests, auditors 
should select those procedures that are relatively more 
effective in detecting fraudulent activities related to 
high-risk assertions and those that can be effective in 
detecting multiple schemes. As indicated in Figure 3, 
study of previous fraud cases indicates that clients are 
most likely (61 percent) to hide side letters or 
agreements with customers from auditors to conceal the 
fraud, with collusion with customers and others 
occurring 31 percent of the time and forging of 
documents 8 percent. Therefore, the planning of audit 
programs should focus on those procedures that may be 
effective in detecting hidden side letters, then on those 
procedures that may be effective in detecting collusions 
between client and its customers.   
For illustrative purposes, we select several 
procedures from a list of procedures that were ranked 
by auditors to be effective in detecting high-risk fraud 
schemes. The effectiveness of these procedures was 
evaluated by the two experienced auditors, a manager 
with 9 years of audit experience and a senior with 4 
years of audit experience. 
In Figure 3, the selected procedures are depicted by 
the rectangular boxes on the right hand side. The 
assumed level of support for various assertions is given 
inside of the evidence boxes. This judgment is based on 
the assumption that after performing these audit 
procedures, the auditor has evaluated the evidence and 
assessed the beliefs regarding the related assertions in 
the evidential diagram. 
The first procedure given in Figure 3 is sending 
confirmations to customers, a standard audit procedure 
that provides evidence concerning multiple assertions. 
This is a procedure that may help detect the evidence 
schemes of using forged documents and of hiding side 
letters from auditors.   
This procedure was used by FLIR’s auditor to 
confirm accounts receivable (A/R) balances. But, the 
sales representative who was involved in a $4.1 million 
sales transaction which was prematurely recognized by 
FLIR and also was involved in the sham shipments of 
the incomplete units refused to return the confirmation. 
Such a non-response from a customer should have 
signaled the auditor that the sale might have been 
fraudulent or there could be some disagreements on the 
amounts or terms of the sale. As shown in Figure 3, we 
assess the strength of the evidence represented by 
E.ES.1 to only be 0.4 that related assertions are true. 
After assessing the collected evidence with regard 
to the related assertions as depicted in Figure 3 and 
aggregating the assumed belief values, the updated 
belief in fraudulent revenue increases to 0.386, clearly 
a high level of belief and a plausibility of 0.418 that 
fraud may have occurred. Although just illustrative, 
the incorporation of all of the evidence impounded in 
Figure 3 and in prior figures implies that the auditor of 
FLIR was on tenuous grounds in expressing an 
unqualified opinion on the FLIR’s 1998 financial 
statements. This conclusion is, of course, consistent 
with the results of SEC investigation. 
Our framework suggests that an appropriate step in 
assessing fraud risk is to take into account how fraud 
may have been perpetrated and concealed. To 
accomplish this, the audit team would need to 
incorporate evidence related to the kinds of evidence 
schemes that typically are used and propagate this 
evidence throughout the evidential network as 
sketched in Figure 1. The analysis results in the 
assessments of belief masses as depicted in Figure 3 
(Step 3). Specifically, the belief that there is fraud in 
the revenue accounts is now 0.386 and the plausibility 
of fraud has now risen to 0.418. Clearly the audit team 
should be very concerned! 
In addition to providing numerical assessments of 
fraud risk based on the rigor of belief function 
updating, the framework provides some important 
information on which schemes the client may have 
used to perpetrate fraud. This knowledge should help 
direct the auditor to tests that are most likely to be 
effective and to a more efficient audit. In the case of 
FLIR, given the assumptions we have used as to 
strength of evidence, the audit team likely would 
benefit most from first investigating hidden sales 
agreements (ES.1), then forged sales documents 
(ES.3) and finally collusion with customers or third 
parties. In fact, these assessments in the FLIR setting 
suggest that it is likely that the management may have 
used all three evidence schemes to perpetrate fraud 
which, in fact, was the actual situation. 
 
6. Summary and conclusion
 
This paper presents and illustrates a framework to 
assess fraud risk and belief in fraud by integrating 
fraud risk triangle factors, account-based fraud 
schemes and evidence-based fraud schemes using an 
evidential reasoning approach based on DS theory. 
The framework extends prior models for assessing 
fraud risk and the belief in fraud by integrating fraud 
schemes and fraud frequency information based on 
previous fraud cases disclosed by the SEC. Additional 
private fraud information available within each audit 
firm can be added to the SEC information to 
potentially improve the audit process even more. 
Importantly, the framework provides a structured 
approach for building connections between risk 
assessment, audit program planning, and evaluation of 
results.  
The approach is illustrated using a real fraud case 
which involves preliminary fraud risk assessments, 
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 audit program planning, evidence aggregation and 
evaluation, and a final fraud risk assessment. As 
expected, the analysis shows that to improve the 
efficiency of fraud detection, auditors should emphasize 
audit procedures that are known to be effective in 
detecting high-risk fraud schemes. 
Our analysis shows that the overall belief in fraud 
increases significantly when specific account schemes 
are incorporated and corresponding items of evidence 
are aggregated. Furthermore, when specific evidence 
schemes are incorporated into the evidential diagram 
and the corresponding items of evidence are assessed 
and aggregated, the overall belief in fraud increases 
significantly from 0.076 to 0.386, suggesting with a  
high degree of belief that fraud is present in the 
reported revenue of FLIR. A similar increase in the 
plausibility of fraud is also shown. 
  As the first attempt to integrate fraud triangle 
factors, account fraud schemes and evidence fraud 
schemes into the assessment of fraud risk, the suggested 
framework is still at a conceptual level and exhibits 
several limitations. For example, being based on a 
relatively novel theory, the Theory of Belief Functions, 
may lead to challenges in gaining academic acceptance. 
Also, any scoring scheme you put in place may provide 
opportunities and incentives for gaming the system.   
The proposed framework also suggests future 
research needs. For example, its performance should be 
subject to further examinations in additional fraud 
cases, in experiments and in practice and in 
comparisons with other approaches to fraud risk 
assessment such as expert systems and neural networks. 
Also, empirical studies could research the frequency 
information integrated into the fraud risk assessment 
model as to data limitations, such as disclosure bias, 
which may affect the accuracy of fraud risk assessment. 
As suggested earlier, audit firms should modify the 
proposed framework by incorporating their firm-
specific experience and knowledge of fraud and of each 
particular client. Additional analytical research could 
utilize a theorem prover or a model checker to assess 
additional framework attributes.   
Lastly, our approach provides the audit team with 
assessments of both belief in fraud and plausibility of 
fraud. While plausibility in fraud assesses the worst 
scenario case that fraud could be present, the belief in 
fraud which is based on the direct evidence can trigger 
further investigations to detect fraud [45]. Thus, both 
measures of risk are important; Pl(fraud) measures the 
maximum risk and Bel(fraud) triggers further 
investigation.  
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Figure 1: The General Evidential Diagram for Assessing Belief in Fraud and Plausibility of Fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 (Step 1): Updating Client Acceptance: Assessment of Belief in Fraud and Plausibility of Fraud in Revenuesa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
aThe first number in an assertion node represents the overall belief in favor of the assertion and the second number 
represents the belief against the assertion. The first number in an evidence node represents the strength of the 
evidence in support of the assertion node(s) it is connected to and the second number represents the belief in support 
of the negation of the assertion(s). 
* The values of R1, R2, R3 are assumed to be at a medium level, say 0.7, in this paper. This means when one fraud 
triangle factor (e.g., incentive) is assessed to be present, the related assertions (e.g., attitude and opportunity) will 
have a 70 percent chance of being present. 
 + No evidence related to attitude of management towards fraud was found in the FLIR Systems, Inc case. The 
evidence node is listed here to remind the auditor that he/she should collect and evaluate evidence that may indicate 
management’s attitude of committing fraud when such risk factors are evident. 
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